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(3) "A few principles or provisions" were "newly borrowed from the Shari'a, whether exclusively, chiefly, or in part"; (4) There were "principles or provisions taken over by the previous legislation from the Shan Al-Sanhuri himself, writing some twenty years later, says that "the new code continues to be representative of Western civil culture, not Islamic legal culture" (alSanhuri, (1962), p. 12). His view was that Egypt's Western-based civil law had become part of the country's legal culture and therefore ';a sudden return (to Islamic law) would have been difficult and would have caused disturbances and confusion" (p. 13).
If the new code had not become comprehensively Islamic it had, however, become Egyptianised -not only in the extensive referencing of "the jurisprudence of the Egyptian courts" but also in the method of codification itself. The rules incorporated from foreign codes had been eclectically chosen on the basis of al-Sanhuri's analysis of their suitability to Egyptian conditions and his notion of justice distilled from his comparaiive studies, including the Shan'a, and, one can presume, his own legal and judicial practice in Egypt. As he told the Senate committee, the legal rules taken from foreign codes "have an existence independent of the sources from which they are taken' (Ziadeh, p. 144, quoting Ministry of Justice pp. 7W71). Moreover some of the rulgs of foreign origin taken from the old code had already been filtered through the Egyptian environment in their application by Egypt's judges tO controversies aris-. . . .
lilg Wlt lln t ;le envlronment. Egyptianisation, however, is itself not without a connection to Islamic law. In his call for the revision of codes at the time of mounting efforts in the country to achieve national independence, al-Sanhuri had said:
It is incumbent on us first and foremost to Egypiianize the jurisprudence and make it completely Egypiian . . . and in this . . . the Islamic Shan'a is before us . . . since it is the most itIlportant element in the intellectual development growing in our land; . . . and this heritage can be a means of breathing the spirit of independence into our jurists and legislators. (quoted in alBishri) p. 628) Al-Sanhuri had repeatedly emphasised that law was "a living thing" continuously "growing and taldng nourishment from its environment". Judicial interpretation of law is certainly one way of making adjustments in law to its environment both to changing social and economic conditions as well as being a way of incorporating a country's customs and traditions into its formalised law. Al-Sanhuri's first scholarly work (1925) Egypt certainly has deep roots in her Islamic past, including the legal relations of that civilisation. Thus, to the extent to which Egypt's judges took account of the legal and social relations embedded in the culture, parts of that legal tradition would have been preserved. But it must also be remembered that, for much of the time since 1876, Egypt's legal history had included foreign judges applying essentially foreign law in mixed courts, and al-Sanhuri was as aware of this as anyone. Nonetheless, it is undeniable that he viewed the jurisprudence of the Egyptiarl courts as centrally important to the revision of the code. Certainly, theoretically, the use of these Egyptian decisions could have served as a conduit of legal customs and traditions, Islamic or otherwise, into the codified law. The validation of this proposition must, however, await a detailed examination of the context and content of the court decisions cited by al-Sanhuri in his commentaries on the new code.
Nonetheless, the "debt to the Shan'a" that Anderson cites as being in explicit form is not inconsiderable. Briefly summarised it is:
The complete legislative history of the new code is contained in the Ministry of Justice publication previously cited, published shortly after the (:ode was passed into law. In addition to the explanatory memorandum accompanying the new code and the Senate debate verbatim, these volumes contain a detailed account, article by ariicle, of the code indicating changes from the old code, discussions in the drafting committees, and discussions of the sources of individual articles and intent. Only by going through these seven volumes will it be possible to assess whether Anderson has picked up all the explicit and implicit "debts to the Shan'a". It would also be interesting to compare the final result with al-Sanhuri's own extensive detailing of possibilities of further incorporation of Islamic rules of law in his 1936 article proposing the revisions.
Anderson's listing does, however, conform fairly closely with a brief summary of the Islamic rules in the code that al-Sanhuri included in an article written later (al-Sanhuri, (1962), p. 12). The main divergences concern the way in which areas of law are defined. There also seems to be some difference of opinion as to whether a couple of the rules or principles come from the old code or were newly added, but this difference may be more apparent than real due to different levels of specificity at which areas of law are identified in the two articles.
Al-Sanhuri also points in this article to another feature of the new code, namely an innovation of "flexibility". The new code, he says, had substituted "flexible standards" in place of "inflexible rules", so that "solutions can change when conditions change" (al-Sanhuri, (1962), p. 14).
Chafik Chehata, once with the Faculty of Law in Cario University, subsequently Professor associated with the Faculte de droit el des sciences economiques of Paris, has also written on the new Egyptian code, first in a series of articles in the ffournal des Tnbunaux Mixtes during the 1940s (Chehata, (194648) ), then concerning specifically "les survivances musulmanes" in it (Chehata, (1965) ). His categorising of the areas of the Shan'a influence is different from Anderson's as is also his general assessment as to the extent of the debt.
Chehata's primary concern is with areas of law in contrast to Anderson's primary division into kind and source of influence. Chehata's basic division is threefold: (1) matters of obligation or personal rights; (2) matters of property rights; and (3) Muslim law as a formal source of Egyptian law. It is in Chehata's area of property rights that Anderson's "new provisions" and "provisions from previous legislation" appear. These are provisions of Shan'a law, Chehata remarks) "applied directly".
As concerns the subject of obligations, "its historical source is Roman law . . . (but) a general theory of obligation was not completely constructed by the Romans". The theory of obligation found in those modern legal systems based on Roman law was developed from various elements in Roman law by means of glossing. "In Muslim law", coniinues Chehata: The Shan's may, however, actually be more than a "prelude to natural law" in this first article of the Egyptian Code. Preceding reference to the Islamic Sharia in the first article the judge is enjoined to ;'decide according to custom'. The contention has been made that in Egypt "custom' ('urf) is for the most part, Islamic law.
In Egyptian society are found many customs ('adat) which are practices known to people ir their transactions, and which are suitable tools for interpreiing the will of contracting pariies. (al-Bishri, (1965), p. 630) But there is ;'no widespread legal consciousness' that they constitute 'a required or determinate rule". Custom (urJ) in its technical meaning is known usually "only insofar as it is a rule that comes from the Shan'a . . . either from the works of Islamic jurists or rooted in their sources (masadir)" (p. 630). That is, judicial interpretation in referring to custom (as urf) would be in point of fact referring to Islamic law.
Both the Libyan and Syrian codes) in the corresponding articles, specify resort to the Shan'a before customs. One Western scholar has hypothesised that "the variants in phrasing" in these codes indicate "a somewhat different approach" to the Shan'a as a source of law (Liebesny, (1975) , p. 95). However, considering the extensive correspondence between legally relevant "custom" and the Shari'a in the Egyptian context alluded to above, the practical effect of this reversed priority in directing the judge to a source of law outside the Code may, in fact, be negligible.
Something of significance does, however, suggest itself. Certainly al-Sanhuri was aware of the subtleties of the legal meaning of 'urf. What, then, has he done? One could look at it in two ways. Either he has made the new code appear to be less susceptible to evolution in an Islamic direction (through the courts' jurisprudence) than it actually is (being but another instance of clothing Islamic substance in "modern" form); or, he has provided for a more populist and Egyptian interpretation of Islamic law before the Shan'a is to be opened up in its entirety. Perhaps he intended both.
What then can be said of al-Sanhuri's revised Civil Code is it or is it not Islamic? Al-Sanhuri's own claims were relatively modest as concerns the islamicisation of the Code. He never said that he had produced an "Islamic Code". It was rather a beginning, the setting of a direction. "The Egyptian legislator believed", he was to write twenty years later; "that a step had been taken toward returning to the Islamic jurisprudence" (al-Sanhuri, (1962), p. 13).
How then, to assess this beginning step? How does one estimate the extent of the incorporation andlor influence of Islamic law on this Code? Does one count articles, calculate ratios, seek underlying principles of legal right? Or does form so overwhelm substance as to make the quest ultimately meaningless? Is the genius of Islamic law, after all, its historical form and method? Is it indeed inseparable from its original foundation and thus inseparable from religion? Or-inasmuch as al-Sanhuri's Civil Code has weathered the years well, has proved itself a very respected and serviceable codeoes it really matter whether it is or is not, or to what extent, Islamic? Now that is a question for which there is a very certain answer: Yes, it does matter. The issue of Islamic law is first and foremost a political question. It is part of the continuing struggle taking place in the wake of the expansion of Western capitalism and with it the spread of Western culture. Today the issue is "dependency'conomic, political, cultural while in al-Sanhuri's day it was called "the national question" political independence and national sovereignty. Given the centrality of law to a nation-state's political symbolism and cultural identity, it would seem mandatory that the law come from "the nation's womb" a phrase used in 1936 (just as the first revision committee met) by a judge of the supreme Shari'a court, whose call for the restoration of the Shan'a was, he said, not for religious reasons but from the "dictate of patriotism".
A nation is disiinguished from other nations by its individual characteristics, chief among which is its jurisprudence . . . Upon my life, the (existing) legislation is not of the nation's womb. (quoted in Ziadeh, p. 140) Al-Sanhuri's patnotic sentiments are not in question. Whereas the project of the revision of the Civil Code was no "restoration of the Shari'a" pure and simple, from its incepiion to its promulgation it was inspired by concerns of nationalist politics. Nor was it al-Sanhuri's only political act. Activities involving him in issues that concerned Egypt's political independence and national status began when he was young and continued for much of his life. These activities were many and various, at times embroiling him in the party politics of his day, at times allowing him to utilise his legal talents. After the Civil Code, his other major contribution to the building of national legal institutions and a modern legal culture in Egypt was his work on the Mailis aldawla. In 1934 al-Sanhuri was again involved in politics, or allegedly so. He was temporarily suspended from the university when the government accused him of questionable political activities, namely forming a group of students which, under the guise of being a literary and cultural group) was pursuing political aims (Castro, (1984 The nature of this power, and the reasoning which underlies its assertion is discussed in the two articles in the journal of the Mailis al-dawla referred to above. Al-Sanhuri summarises them in his introduction.
According to al-Sanhuri, the judge's role is to interpret the laws and see that they are executedonstitutional laws and ordinary laws. All laws carry the presumption of executability. However, if the judge finds two laws in conflict (including the constitution, which has a certain presumption of priority), he cannot apply both of them. He does not, however, void one of the laws. He refrains from applying it to the case he is judging. "The judgment looks first at the constitutionality of decree-laws and goes from there to the constitutionality of law itselfr' (al-Sanhuri, (1950) pp. 11-13). The decision, he says, "is long and complex", and he proceeds to give his own reasoning as to what the right rests on. ';There is no doubt that the administrative judiciary may void a decree-law for its non-constitutionality." If we stop there "the matter is simple". However, al-Sanhuri is of the opinion that the judiciary whether administrative judiciary or the regular judiciary has the duty to be the supervisors of the constitutionality of "law itself:', that is of parliamentary legislation whether the legislative power exercised is strictly defined or discretionary, and in regard to both the form and the substance of the law.
The Makkamat al-naqd (Court of Cassation) had actually preceded the administrative court in issuing a judgment of the matter but its ruling on the constitutional right was "extemporaneous", says al-Sanhuri, and then an appeal court issued a contrary decision. The latter stated categorically that the legislature was the sole authority as to the constitutionality of its legislation. It is this opinion that al-Sanhllri counters when giving his own reasoning as to the right and-the duty of the judicial authority to review the consiitutionality of laws.
"The lssue is not whether law is an act of legislative sovereignty or not, nor whether the legislature is using defined or discretionary power." The fact of the matter is rather that "the administrative judiciary does not actually nullify administrative regulaiions, leave alone legislaiion. An opponent of a law may not ask the court to declare the law void from its incepiion, but rather may ask that it not be applied." Al-Sanhuri reasoned:
Is it possible for judges to apply legislation when their opinion as to its constitulionality differs from that of the legislature? The basis of this right (of substituting their opinion for that of the legislature) is not, however, found in any text of the Egyptian Constitution nor is it a general principle. Judging the constitutional correctness of legisIation, objectively speaking, is judicial work. And if it is said that the principle of the separation of powers is violated, it may be answered: The judiciary exercises supervision over parliament's opinion (about the constitutionality of legislation) not by initiating legislation as that would be interference with the legislative power-but by a judicial act.
The applicable constitutional principle is that powers should be exercised in accordance with the Constitution. The parliament contradicts this principle if it issues legislation that opposes the Constitution, and rather than apply unconstitutional laws the judges record this violation. Thus it is permitted that judges look at the constitutionality of laws-indeed it is their duty tO do so-in order to prevent application of legislation which, in their estimation, infringes the constltutlon.
Administrative judges and regular judges are equal in this competence. And if it is said this reality is not equivalent to an authority to nullify an administrative order and certainly not authority to nullify a law) the answer is: It is not nullifying a legislaiive command as the judicial decision does not nallify the law in quesiion. Rather, the decision limits itself to the impossibility of applying the law in the case at hand. (al-Sanhuri, (1950) p. 15-16) If this does not seem to be the full power of " judicial reviewX' it comes close. Confirmation of the authority that this judicial decision conferred on the Egyptian judiciary and reinforcement of its independence of executive and legislative power is found in the fact that, even after 18 years of pressure on the judiciary from the new regime) that regime still found it necessary to establish a special high court directly under executive authority to rule on questions of constituiionality. The precipitating instance) of course, had been the wholesale dismissal of judges in the iCmassacre of the judiciary" in 1969 by an act of the President of the Republic) and the subsequent issuing of a court decision declaring the executive action illegal.
The Constitutional Court established in 1970 (although in the first years it did not carry the title of a constitutional court) remains outside the regular judicial structure, and its judges are appointed directly by the executive and not pursuant to the advice of the High Judiciary Council upon which sit members of the judiciary. However, although consetuiional questions now are submitted to the Constitutional Court, issues concerg civil rights are still usually taken to the Majlis al-dawla by virtue of its coniinuing funciion as protector of ciiizens from arbitrary and unwarranted government action. Thus whereas refusal to apply laws for reasons of unconstitutionality is no longer formally possible, the Mailis al-dawla retains its authority to review execuiive action, and it continues to be adviser to both the executive and the legislature. Laws, before they are submitted to the People's Assembly today must still be passed on by the Mailis al-dawla.
The During the first 18 months of the Revolution, when al^Sanhuri was still in place in the Mailis al-dawla, the old legalities were stretched but they were not ignored, and the Maylis al-dawla became involved with allowing approval of the decree-law restrictirlg political parties. Muhammad Naguib's memoirs indicate that al-Sanhuri was opposed to this law but "yielded to the persistence of Suliman Hafiz", his deputy? and the argument that "the parties have been corrupted, which negates the real meaning of parliamentary democracy". However, al-Sanhuri hedged his agreement by including the proviso that "the government would not interfere unless it was necessary . . . and such interference would be under the direct supervision of the Mailis al-dawla" (Shakra, ( 1985 ) , pp . 30W30 1 ) . 16 They were C'held to blame for the state of corruption which pervaded Egypt7s political life" from the date when the Brltish government had sent tanks to the Palace to impose a Wafd government on King Farouk. Al-Sanhuri's name was, of course, among them.
It is believed that "some army elements" had incited the mob and instigated the attack (Ziadeh, (1968), p. 156) It is claimed that the reason for the assault on the Mailis al-dawla and al-Sanhuri at that time in particular was the publication in al-Akhbar (newspaper) that the Mailis al-dawla was 'sabout to issue deerees (sac) against the Revolueon . . . (and) it had been rumoured that Dr al-Sanhuri was to become

XI. SYNTHESIS OF THEORY AND PRACTICE lNhe Major Treatises
The incident at the Mailis al-dawla) followed by the decree naming al-Sanhuri as one of those whose "political rights" were taken anvay, effectively ended his public life. Thereafter, he worked at home on al-Wasit, the first volume of which had appeared in 1952, and for a time continued to lecture at the Institute of High Arab Studies.
He was also called upon to assist with the drafting of more Arab codes and basic Sanhuri, (195F1957) ). The title, in the words of Linant de Bellefonds, who translates it into French as "Les sources du droil subjectif', is "somewhat confusing". He explains that it is "a study of the rules which the free will (volontet) should take into account when that will is applied to posiiive law (quand celle-ci est appelee a avoir des effiets jundiques)" (Bellefonds, (1958) , p. 477).
The work, continues Bellefonds, is an examination of a question that has engaged the attention of modern Muslim jurists, namely to extract a general theory of legal action from the dispersed elements in the great classical treatises which do not attempt to synthesise. That which distinguishes al-Sanhuri's work from others is the manner (lXespnl) It is the spinal column in Western law which derives from Roman law, and the source of this right, whether personal or material, is the most precise of subjects, although it is most vague in Western law. We will attempt here to specify them in Western law and then deal with them in Islc law. That way we will put Islamic law beside Western law as regards those features that have central importance .... We will deal with Islamic law in the way we deal with Western law to see whether personal and material right in Islamic law is to be found in the sense known in that Western law which derives from Roman law, and whether we can attribute all these sources to legal conveyance and legal fact in the meaning known in Western law. (p. 5)
Bellefonds, both at the beginning of his review of this and again in closing, recommends at the work be translated so that it "can be put in the hands of all jurists" (Bellefonds, (1958) , p. 478). Since this has not occurred we can, perhaps) consider it a heretical notion. The "heresy" is, of course, to suggest that basic areas of concern to Western jurisprudence could benefit by comparison with the Islamic Shari'a, or that there might possibly be something valuable in the Shan'a, not just for orientalist scholars but for Western jurists.
Bellefonds comments further on the value of al-Sanhuri's work in another review written when the fifth volume was published. As al-Sanhuri has maintained throughout his writings, this reviewer comments, perhaps there may be principles of justice in Islam that can be considered "more just" than principles in corresponding legal areas in the laws of the West. He not only posited Islamie standards against the existing eode, but also included usage of that eode in Egypt-its interpretation and applieation by the Egyptian eourts. In addition, he eonsidered the most recent innovations of Western legal thinking as it eoneerned the requirements for " justiee" of partieular "modern" eonditions.
In this most sensitive matter of usury/interest as referred to by the abovementioned two eommentators on al-Sanhuri's work, one ean demonstrate, I believe, al-Sanhuri's method and the distinetion he makes between the "seientifie stage" of work and the 4'legislaiive stage" in the refurbishing of Islamie law for moderr; use. The Masadir represents work of the "seientifie stage" essentially. There, as Bellefonds expresses it, he "exeavates"; that is, he explores the ways in whieh legal concepts have been dealt with by various sehools of Islaniie law and the great Islamie scholars of jurisprudence, how these eoneepts have beeome elaborated, and in what ways they have developed and ehanged over the eourse of the eenturies and from one legal mind to the next. That there is a progression or development in thinking of the Islamie scholars (if only by virtue of having to apply eoncepts to new circumstanees) is taken for granted. In "exeavations"-archeologieal or legal-one finds eaeh succeeding construction built upon structures which were developed previously. The plight of Islamic law in "modern times," as I read al-Sanhuri's formulation of the issue, is not that it did not historieally progress and not that it cannot, but rather that great legal minds stopped working on legal problems in the light of new circumstances and thus the law ceased to evolve. Therefore, it would seem that it is not an issue of "the theoretical question of the harmony between Western and Islamic legal standards" that Khadduri claims al-Sanhuri does not resolve (p. 209n) but rather a concern with turning again to developing the Islaniic legal concepts, this time in the light of new ("modern") conditions. That there is no "harmony" is not the point. We should not expect there to be one. Otherwise Islamie law would not be distinctive and "one of the world's great legal systems", and the exereise of developing a comparative law within al-Sanhuri's frame of referenee with Islamic law as a main pillar would have no meaning. Therefore, in order for the theoretieal status of "usury" to be grappled with under modern eonditions one must understand the variations of circumstanees and contexts under whieh it has been dealt with in the past. If al-Sanhuri "readily aceepts" that "interest" is distinguishable from "usury" then his excavations presumably must have shown him that "interest" neither has nor can be considered to be the evolution of the eoneept of "usury," and the rationale for "interest" rests elsewhere. And that is where the examination of "modern" systems enters. As Bellefonds notes, each volume of the Masadir has a twofold comparative organisation. There is an internal comparison between the doctrines of the different schools of Muslim law and relationships between them, and then a consideration of legal coneepts in "the great European legal systems, ancient and modern" (Bellefonds, (1958) , p. 477). Some eoneepts of what eonstitutes "just" legal relations are the same or similar, some different. Some eoneepts appear in one system and do not appear in another. How was Roman law glossed and later revised for use in the European eodes? A study of modern legal systems moreover implies a coneern with how these states dealt with their own "legislative stage". Usury and interest are distinguished in modern Western law; usury was condemned by both historical systems. The record of where and when and how the distinciion appeared in those systems and where it has, is the stuff of which al-Sanhuri's "comparative-historical method" is composed.
The Masadir, as the record of al-Sanhuri's work in his prescribed "scientific stage", is colossal in scope:
Rarely are modern scholars of jurisprudence emboldened to compare the Muslim system to that of other civilizaiions. The gulf separaiing them appears too large. It takes all the learriing of al-Sanhuri to succeed in construciing a bridge between them. (Bellefonds, (1958), p. 478) The "bridge" as should be noted, is not "harmony", as such but identification of theoretical and actual legal relationships and concepts of lawr of justice---which each reflects. Comparison on a basis of theory is an entirely different proposition than casuistic comparisons. And it is the former wherein is to be found the core of al-Sanhuri's method. Al-Sanhuri's work on the modern codes had indeed, as Bellefonds notes, "served him well" (p. 478). It certainly sensitised him to the matter of theoretical structures underlying isolated legal concepts and therefore connecting them.
Then there is the matter of the rich detail that has been produced in the course of the development of theory.
Most modern writers, when dealing with the classical writers, are not able, as al-Sanhuri is, to separate sharply between that which is their own innovaiion and that which has been taken from elsewhere. If one day this work is translated the Western reader will be amazed by the richness of information concernlng, notably, developments pointed out by the author in German, Roman, Latin, etc. legal systems, that his method of discovering relationships with the Muslim system have led him to study. (p. 478)
Where the Masadir records the dialectic between ancient and modern, Eastern and Western legal systems, al-Wasit contains another kind of dialectic, or rather, a new, more advanced, synthesis of theory and practice that the new Civil Code of Egyptand by extensiorl those of other Arab states represents. Al-Sanhuri had been working on the synthesis of theory and practice, in fact, throughout his life, and his work had a pattern. As he tells us in the introduction to the first volume of al-Wasit, it is the middle work between the summary work (al-Waiiz) and the fully elaborated work (al-Mabsut). Perhaps the title is best rendered Middle Commentazy.
But there never was a mabsat. Al-Sanhuri is quoted as saying in 1968:
Al-Wastl became more elaborated than I had anticipated. I wanted it to be of medium length but it becarne the long elaboraiion. I do not believe there is more in me. (Mursi, l9SO)) It forms, however, the comprehensive treatise on Egypt's civil law, written by the person who was most knowledgeable by far as to the meaning and intention of the provisions of the new code, how and why it had been set out in the way it had, and how it should be interpreted; how it was unique and independent as a code, and how the civil law of Egypt became, in a word, Egyptianised.
It is possible to trace how he had begun preparing this work from his first writings in Arabic. He tells us in the introduciion of al-Mujiz (1938) that he had not intended to issue the mujiz until after he had come out with the mabsut) for which he had already brought out the first part, Nazanyyal al-aqd in 1934. However, he was to decide that the need for a mujiz was at least as great. He had in mxnd, he says, "a concise volume, not an abridgement, to make it detailed but without elaboraiion, to meet general needs as well as those of the judiciary". Because he was particularly cognisant of the needs of the latter, "many judicial decisions were included in the notes", although he restricted himself "to Egypiian court decisions") that is, to what he believed was needed by the practitioner of law.
There is no difference between the two books (Nazanyyat al-'aqd and al-Mujiz) except that in the abridgement the issues have been made more concise. Whoever reads al-Mujiz can proceed to ffie mabsut which is more detailed. The maiiz paves the way for the mabs1lt. Such studies will be arduous, he says, and will take "scores of years" before there can be "a renaissance like that which occurred in Romarl law", so that Islamic law "will be suitable for the modern age" (p. 28). He emphasises that such an activity does not involve simply taking precepts of Western law and "trying to make them come from Islamic law or claiming that Western law is Islamic law" (p. 29).
This article indicates two things. Firstly, al-Sanhuri has remained firm in the essentials of both the task ahead and the method for making the Shan'a "suitable for the modern age". Secondly, it also indicates that al-Sanhuri does not consider himself to have completed the task as specified. There is still plenty of work remaining to be done by others.
The "past" as al-Sanhuri specifies it, also includes the experiences of Arab countries. There are three situations: (1) those states which continued with an "unwritten" The purpose of this amendment, said the special committee which had drafted the amendment in a report submitted to and approved by the Mailis al-sha'b in July 1979, was "to require the Mailis al-shanb, when seeking a rule of law, to have recourse to the rules of the Shan'a to the exclusion of any other system of law" and in order to insure that "legislation does not contradict the foundations and general principles of the Shari'a" (quoted in ARE, (1985a), p. 997). The General Committee of the Majlis alshab in a report approved on 15 September 1981 was more specific as to the meaning of the amendment:
The "true purpose of the 1980 amendment to Article 20 of the Constitution", said the Court, is that it is intended to be "a limitation on the power of the legislalive authority" as to the sources from which it should draw its rules of law (p. 999/p. 105).
Otherwise, the implication would be that "all past legislation which contradicts Shari'a principles should be scrapped", said the Court, and such a situation would "clearly lead to contradictions and confusion in the judicial process in a manner which would threaten stability". Moreover: had the legislator of the Consiituiion wanted to incorporate the principles of the Shari'a into the Consiituiion specifically, or had he intended that these principles be enforced by the courts without the need to formulate them as specific legislaiive texts according to the set procedures of the Consiituiion--he did not lack the authority so to provide, clearly and explicitly. (p. 999/ p. 105-106) However, restricting the applicability of the constitutional amendment to future legislation "does not exempt the legislator from responsibility for the past laws", continued the Court, especially those "in contradiction to the principles of the Shari'a". It is, moreover, the legislator's responsibility "to take the initiative in sifting out any infringement of the aforementioned principles from the texts of these laws". Ultimately, in order that there be harmony between past and future legislation, "they all must agree with these principles" (pp. 999-1000/p. 106).
In assessing the significance of this decision, Saba Habachy, friend and contemporary of al-Sanhuri, has highlighted two features for particular comment. In denying retroactive effect to the amendment to Article 2 and interpreting the change to mean that the Sharina is to be the main source offuture legislation, "the responsibility for implementing Article 2 of the Constitution as amended (has been) shifted from the judicial to the legislative authority" (Habachy, (1986), p. 240). He aIso notes that the Court has quoted a "significant phrase" from preparatory reports concerning the proposed amendment to Article 2 of the Constitution. This phrase deprecates: the change from the present legal system of Egypt which goes back more than one hundred years and its replacement by a complete system of Islarnic law.
The source of the quoted language is the Report of the General Committee of the Majlis al-sha'b at the time the Amendment was being considered (see above). The Court, comments Dr Habachy, "recognises . . . the necessity of change of law in the Shan'a according to the requirements of time and place" (p. 240).
The language quoted by the Court, referred to above, carries the further implication, of course, that the present legal system is also part of Egypt's legal heritage.
But the prime significance of this decision, although based on a legal technicality and adding nothing to the "centuries-old argument" concernint, interest, is, for Dr Habachy, "that it has saved, not merely Article 226, but the entire new Egyptian Code of Professor Sanhuri of which the article in question is a part" (p. 240).
The saving of al-Sanhuri's Civil Code with one fell swoop of the judicial pen went largely unnoticed because, on the same day, Egypt's Constitutional Court announced another decision, anxiously awaited for many months and much more publicised. It was a case concerning family law, also brought as a constitutional challenge on the strength of the amended Article 2 of the Constitution, this time to the Personal Status Law of 1979 ("Jihan's Law") which was declared unconstitutional. This law had done such unspeakably 'Cun-Islamic'' things as allow a divorced wife to continue to live with her children in the apartrnent of marriage, and give a wife the right to apply for a divorce when her husband married another woman.20 The Egyptian general public was at that moment in history considerably more interested in apartments) divorces and polygamous marriages than in the saving of the Civil Code.
Nor The government had a position paper on the issue, and at the close of the debate the Government's communication was read. There were six points, the general sense of which is as follows:
(1) Egypt's legal system is one of stable laws which have their basis in the Shan'a) the Civil Code being a good example; 20 The decision of unconstitutionality was, however, based on technical rather than substantive grounds. The Court said in its opinion that reform of family laws was not of sufficient urgency to justify the use of exceptional presidential decree-law powers delegated by the legislature for use in emergeneies or while the Mailis al-shayb was in recess.
(2) The judiciary in Egypt is firmly established with its system embedded in the constitution and the laws which agree with the principles of the Shan'a; it would be no small matter to rebuild such a system and much of value in past efforts would be destroyed in the process. Therefore it is preferable to work on developing what already exists, according to the Shari'a;
(3) The principles of the Islamic religion call for a society of equality, justice, sufficiency, tolerance and other qualities of which we can be justly proud in front of the whole world; and our work is to assure such a society; (4) There is consensus on the principles of the Shan'a concerning civil transactions; only in some details is there controversy, and the controversial issues must be studied carefully; (5) Egypt has never been isolated from the world and interacts with what happens today throughout the world; we must find ways to surmount the present burdens of our international commodity transactions (amounting to more than fifty per cent of GNP), so that we may benefit from them; That is where the matter presently rests. Action on substitute codes is in abeyance, "Dr al-Sanhuri's Civil Code" remains the basic civil law of Egypt, and the present government the executive and the legislature has given formal recognition to the efforts of al-Sanhuri to construct a law that would be in accord with the Shan'a in spirit and in as many particulars as "modern conditions" permitted.
